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This paper develops a two-country dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model to investigate the transmission of a global ￿nancial crisis
to a small open economy. Central to our framework are ￿nancial frictions
that play a major role in the macroeconomic adjustment to global credit
tightening. Our two-country set-up with explicit consideration of both
￿nancial and trade channels between the countries enables us to account
for some important aspects of the current global ￿nancial crisis experi-
ence. We ￿nd that small open economies hit by a sudden stop arising
from ￿nancial distress in the global economy are likely to face a more
prolonged crisis than when they experience a ￿nancial shock of domestic
origin. This is because an important source of di¢ culty in responding to
a global ￿nancial crisis is the inability of countries to export their way
out of crisis due to the slump in world consumer demand initiated by the
global ￿nancial distress -as is painfully experienced by many countries in
contemporary times. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature, our
results suggest that the greater a country￿ s trade integration with the rest
of the world, the greater the response of its macroeconomic aggregates to
a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows.
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The global ￿nancial turmoil that has gripped the world economy since August 2007
has been widely viewed as unprecedented, at least since the Great Depression of the
1930s. The turbulence in ￿nancial systems was followed by a signi￿cant reduction
in real economic activity in a large number of countries.1 For emerging market and
developing economies, ￿nancial crisis is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, since the
early 1990s countries as diverse as Mexico, Russia, a group of East Asian countries,
Brazil, Turkey and Argentina have all been hit by either currency or ￿nancial crises,
or both. Although country experiences have varied with regard to the source of
di¢ culty in each episode, the pro￿le of crises has been fairly similar. A "sudden
stop" of capital in￿ ows is almost always followed by a sharp contraction in economic
activity. Furthermore, many countries witnessed substantial losses in the value of
their currencies, which greatly helped in recovering from the crises. In essence,
these countries were able to expand net exports to alleviate or compensate for the
contractionary e⁄ects of foreign currency liabilities following devaluations ￿ the so-
called balance sheet e⁄ects. For instance, sharp current account reversals were a
common feature of recovery processes in most Asian countries following the 1997
crisis.
When set against this background, the current global ￿nancial crisis is di⁄erent
in two major ways.2 Firstly, from the viewpoint of an emerging market economy, the
source of the sharp reduction in capital in￿ ows on this occasion has been the severe
liquidity squeeze in the ￿nancial markets of developed economies, unlike in any of
the previous experiences. Indeed, the slowdown in ￿nancial ￿ ows to the emerging
market economies followed from the virtual standstill in the credit markets in the US
and the UK spreading to other major ￿nancial markets. Secondly, emerging market
countries have also witnessed a substantial fall in their exports as the ￿nancial crisis
hit consumer spending in the developed world. Hence, given the strong downturn in
the global economy, countries are unlikely to be able to export their way out of the
crisis even though a large number of countries experienced substantial devaluations
of their currencies.
The above evaluation suggests that both ￿nancial and trade channels have been
1See, for example, The IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009.
2See, Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) for a comprehensive evaluation of the di⁄erences between the
current and previous experiences of ￿nancial crises.
1crucial in the transmission of the current global ￿nancial crisis to emerging market
countries. Motivated by this observation, in this paper, we develop a two-country
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with an explicit treatment
of both trade and ￿nancial linkages between the countries. This enables us to inves-
tigate possible spillover e⁄ects of a ￿nancial crisis originating in the global economy
on to a domestic, small open economy (hereafter SOE). There are three features of
our model economy that are representative of emerging market economies. First, the
domestic economy exhibits ￿nancial frictions in the form of high leverage; that is, a
large share of investment is ￿nanced with external resources. Second, the borrowing
is taken to be in foreign currency terms as is common in emerging market countries.
In the presence of foreign currency debt, a change in the perception of foreign lenders
of the current state of the economy leads to an endogenous adjustment in the cost of
borrowing, generating a negative feedback loop between real and ￿nancial sectors.
Finally, our model gives explicit consideration to exchange rate pass-through, the
scale of which distinguishes the experiences of emerging and mature economies.
Our model di⁄ers from those in the existing literature in a number of ways.
First, we incorporate explicitly a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism, with proper con-
sideration of micro-foundations of ￿nancial frictions. Second, the external ￿nance
premium is fully derived from ￿rst principles of the optimal contract problem be-
tween the borrower and the lender. This is of particular importance as it allows us
to obtain analytical insights into the causes and consequences of endogenous changes
in credit conditions. Third, in our model sudden stops take the form of a change in
lenders￿perception regarding the state of the economy (as in Curdia, 2007, 2008).
This contrasts with existing work on sudden stops such as Devereux et al. (2006) and
Gertler et al. (2007) which de￿nes the initial shock as either an aggregate structural
shock, such as a rise in foreign interest rates, or an adverse shock to fundamentals.
A crucial departure from the conventional ￿nancial accelerator is that, ex ante,
lenders have imperfect knowledge about borrowers￿productivity. An unfavorable
change in lenders￿perception creates a self-ful￿lling pessimism about the economy
through the enforcement of tighter credit conditions and the associated decline in the
productivity of capital-producing entrepreneurs in equilibrium. Given our explicit
treatment of the rest of the world (hereafter ROW), we are able to fully consider ex-
change rate, trade and ￿nancial channels that transmit direct and indirect e⁄ects of
2global ￿nancial shocks to the SOE. Such a modelling strategy enables us to consider
important transmission channels which are ignored in earlier studies.
The main channels through which a global ￿nancial shock impacts upon the
emerging market economy are as follows. The re-pricing of credit risk increases the
cost of external ￿nancing, inducing a sharp decline in output and domestic in￿ ation,
and a depreciation of the domestic currency. Since the external risk premium is
tied to the leverage ratio, ￿rms reduce new borrowing in order to decrease the
endogenous component of the risk premium. Moreover, the fall in domestic in￿ ation
and the depreciation of the domestic currency increase the real debt burden for
leveraged households, leading to a decrease in consumption. The depreciation of the
domestic currency enables the home country to compensate, at least partly, for the
decline in consumption and investment demand. However, this only applies if the
￿nancial crisis originated in the domestic economy. In contrast, when the source
of the ￿nancial shock is global, the export channel works in the opposite direction
with global contraction leading to a fall in export demand for the domestic output
resulting in a further decline in domestic economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets-out the struc-
ture of our two-country DSGE model by describing household, ￿rm and entrepre-
neurial behavior with special emphasis on the description of ￿nancial frictions. Sec-
tion 3 presents the solution and the calibration of the model. Section 4 presents
impulse responses to the ￿nancial shock and discusses the results. Finally, Section
5 provides the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We develop a two-country sticky price DSGE model where both the trade and ￿-
nancial linkages between the two countries are fully speci￿ed. Based on the ￿nancial
accelerator mechanism developed by Bernanke et al.(1999), our model shares its
basic features with the recent theoretical studies incorporating the ￿nancial accel-
erator in combination with liability dollarization such as Cespedes et al. (2004),
Devereux et al. (2006), Gertler et al. (2007) and Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007).
Two important modi￿cations are introduced here. First we incorporate an endoge-
nous change in the risk premium due to the change in the perception of the foreign
lenders. Second, we enrich the model to re￿ ect incomplete pass through in the short
3run by considering pricing to market behavior of the ￿rms.
In our framework, both the SOE and the ROW are populated by households,
￿rms, entrepreneurs and a monetary authority. Households receive utility from
consumption and provide labor to the production ￿rms. They obtain loans from
both domestic and (incomplete) international ￿nancial markets. The households
also own the ￿rms in the economy, and therefore receive pro￿ts from these ￿rms.
There are three types of ￿rms in the model. Production ￿rms produce a dif-
ferentiated ￿nal consumption good using both capital and labor as inputs. These
￿rms engage in local currency pricing and face price adjustment costs. As a result,
￿nal goods￿prices are sticky in terms of the local currency of the markets in which
they are sold. Importing ￿rms that sell the goods produced in the foreign economy
also have some market power and face adjustment costs in changing prices. Price
stickiness in export and import prices causes the law of one price to fail such that
exchange rate pass through is incomplete in the short run.3 Finally, there are com-
petitive ￿rms that combine investment with rented capital to produce un￿nished
capital goods, that are then sold to entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs play a major role in the model. They produce capital which is
rented to production ￿rms and ￿nance their investment in capital through internal
funds as well as external borrowing; however, agency costs make the latter more
expensive than the former. As monitoring the business activity of borrowers is a
costly activity, lenders must be compensated by an external ￿nance premium in
addition to the international interest rate. The magnitude of this premium varies
with the leverage of the entrepreneurs, linking the terms of credit to balance sheet
conditions.
The model for the SOE is presented in this section and we use a simpli￿ed version
of the model for the ROW. In what follows, variables without superscripts refer to
the home economy, while variables with a star indicate the foreign economy variables
(unless indicated otherwise).
3This is motivated by the considerable empirical evidence of pricing-to-market and incomplete
exchange rate pass-through for small open economies as analyzed by Naug and Nymoen (1996) and
Campa and Goldberg (2002). See also Golberg and Knetter (1997) for a detailed survey.
42.1 Households
















where Ct is a composite consumption index, Ht is hours of work, Et is the mathemat-
ical expectation conditional upon information available at t, ￿ is the representative
consumer￿ s subjective discount factor where 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0 is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ’ > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour
supply.



























where j 2 [0;1] indicates the goods varieties and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among goods produced within a country. Equation (2) suggests that the expenditure
share of the domestically produced goods in the consumption basket of households
is given by ￿ and 0 < ￿ < 1:
Demand for home and foreign goods is derived from the household￿ s minimization









and the corresponding price index is given by:
Pt = [￿P
1￿￿
H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)P
1￿￿
M;t ]1=(1￿￿); (5)
where PH;t and PM;t represent the prices for domestic and imported goods and
Pt denotes the consumer price index (CPI).4 The corresponding price indices for
4Note that, when ￿ = 1, openness of the economy is given by (1 ￿ ￿), the consumption index






















The real exchange rate Qt is de￿ned as Qt =
StP￿
t
Pt , where St is the nominal ex-






is the aggregate price index for foreign country￿ s consumption goods in foreign cur-
rency. In contrast to standard open economy models, our two-country framework
enables us to determine P￿
t endogenously in the ROW block.
Households have access to two types of non-contingent one-period debt; one
denominated in domestic currency, Bt; and the other in foreign currency, DH
t , with a
nominal interest rate of it and i￿
t￿D;t. Due to imperfect capital mobility, households






they borrow from the rest of the world.5 Households own all home production and
the importing ￿rms and thus are recipients of pro￿ts, ￿t. Other sources of income
for the representative household are wages Wt, and new borrowing net of interest
payments on outstanding debts, both in domestic and foreign currency. Then, the
representative household￿ s budget constraint in period t can be written as follows:
PtCt + (1 + it￿1)Bt + (1 + i￿
t￿1)￿D;t￿1StDH
t = WtHt + Bt+1 + StDH
t+1 + ￿t: (6)
The representative household chooses the paths for fCt, Ht, Bt+1, DH
t+1g1
t=0 in
order to maximize its expected lifetime utility in (1) subject to the budget constraint

























Equation (7) dictates the labor supply decision. Equations (8) and (9) are the
Euler equations for the purchase of domestic and foreign currency bonds. In the
absence of ￿nancial frictions, the combination of (8) and (9) would yield the standard
uncovered interest rate parity condition.
5This premium is introduced for technical reasons to maintain the stationarity in the economy￿ s
net foreign assets, following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
62.2 Firms
2.2.1 Production Firms
Each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated good indexed by j 2 [0;1] using the production
function:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j)1￿￿Kt(j)￿; (10)
where At denotes labor productivity, common to all the production ￿rms and Nt(j) is
the labor input which is a composite of household, Ht(j), and entrepreneurial labor,
HE
t (j); de￿ned as Nt (j) = Ht (j)
1￿￿ HE
t (j)
￿. Kt(j) denotes capital provided by
the entrepreneur, as is explored in the following subsection.
Assuming that the price of each input is taken as given, the production ￿rms
minimize their costs subject to (10). Omitting the ￿rm-speci￿c indices for notational
simplicity, cost minimizing behavior implies the following ￿rst order conditions:6
Wt =










t is the entrepreneurial wage rate, Rt is the rental rate of capital and MCt







exhibit the fact that the cost-minimizing input combination that each ￿rm chooses
depends on the relative factor price, that is there is some substitution betweenlabor
and capital.
Firms have some market power and they segment domestic and foreign markets
with local currency pricing, where PH;t(j) and PX;t(j) denote price in domestic
market (in domestic currency) and price in foreign market (in foreign currency).
Firms also face quadratic menu costs in changing prices expressed in the units of
consumption basket given by ￿i
2 (
Pi;t(j)
Pi;t￿1(j) ￿ 1)2 for di⁄erent market destinations i =
H;X. This generates a gradual adjustment in the prices of goods in both markets, as
suggested by Rotemberg (1982). The combination of local currency pricing together
with nominal price rigidities implies that ￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate
have a smaller impact on export prices so that exchange rate pass-through to export
prices is incomplete in the short run.
6For simplicity, we normalize H
E
t to unity.
7As ￿rms are owned by domestic households, the individual ￿rm maximizes its
expected value of future pro￿ts using the household￿ s intertemporal rate of substi-

















where YH;t(j) and YX;t(j) represent domestic and foreign demand for the domesti-
cally produced good j. We assume that di⁄erent varieties have the same elasticities




)￿￿Yi;t; for i = H;X; (15)





and PX;t is the export price index given by PX;t ￿
[
R 1
0 PX;t(j)1￿￿dj]1=(1￿￿). YH;t represents the domestic demand for domestically pro-
duced goods given by the domestic consumption and investment demand. YX;t
denotes the foreign aggregate export demand for domestic goods and is assumed to








where ￿￿ denotes the fraction of world demand for exports, ￿￿ is the price elasticity
of global demand for domestic output and P￿
t is the foreign price level expressed in
terms of the foreign currency.
Since the pro￿t maximization condition is symmetric among ￿rms, the optimal



























































Pt+1. Equation 17 (18) represents a New Keynesian Phillips curve
for domestic goods sold in the home country (foreign country). This expression can
be simpli￿ed to yield the conventional mark up rule in which ￿rms set the price as
a mark up over marginal cost when there is no adjustment cost, ￿H = 0 (￿X = 0).
2.2.2 Importing Firms
There is a set of monopolistically competitive importing ￿rms, owned by domestic
households, who buy foreign goods at prices StP￿
t and then sell to the domestic
market. They are also subject to a price adjustment cost with ￿M ￿ 0; the cost of
price adjustment parameter, analogous to the production ￿rms. This implies that
there is some delay between exchange rates changes and the import price adjustments
so that the short run exchange rate pass through to import prices is also incomplete.




























where YM;t denotes the aggregate import demand of the domestic economy.
2.2.3 Un￿nished Capital Producing Firms















where the domestic and imported investment goods￿prices are assumed to be the
same as the domestic and import consumer goods prices, PH;t and PM;t. The new
capital stock requires the same combination of domestic and foreign goods so that
the nominal price of a unit of investment equals the price level, Pt: This implies that
IH;t = ￿(
PH;t
Pt )￿￿It and IM;t = (1 ￿ ￿)(
PM;t
Pt )￿￿It.
9Competitive ￿rms use investment as an input, It and combine it with rented
capital Kt to produce un￿nished capital goods. Following Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), we assume that the marginal return to investment in terms of capital goods
is decreasing in the amount of investment undertaken (relative to the current capital
stock) due to the existence of adjustment costs, represented by ￿I
2 ( It
Kt ￿ ￿)2 where
￿ is the depreciation rate. Then, the production technology of the ￿rms producing
un￿nished capital can be represented by ￿t(It;Kt) = [ It
Kt ￿ ￿I
2 ( It
Kt ￿ ￿)2]Kt which
exhibits constant returns to scale so that the un￿nished capital producing ￿rms earn











￿ ￿)2]Kt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt: (21)
The optimality condition for these ￿rms with respect to the choice of It yields
the following nominal price of a unit of capital Qt:
Qt
Pt





As stated earlier, entrepreneurs are key players in our model. They transform un-
￿nished capital goods and sell then to the production ￿rms. They ￿nance their
investment by borrowing from foreign lenders.7 There is a continuum of entrepre-
neurs indexed by k in the interval [0,1]. Each entrepreneur has access to a stochastic
technology in transforming Kt+1(k) units of un￿nished capital into !t+1(k)Kt+1(k)
units of ￿nished capital goods. The idiosyncratic productivity !t(k) is assumed to be
i.i.d. (across time and across ￿rms), drawn from a distribution F(:), with p.d.f of f(:)




At the end of period t, each entrepreneur k has net worth denominated in do-
mestic currency, NWt(k). The budget constraint of the entrepreneur is de￿ned as
follows:
PtNWt(k) = QtKt+1(k) ￿ StDE
t+1(k); (23)
7See, Mishkin (1998) and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999, 2005) for the importance of foreign
currency borrowing in emerging market countries.
8This characterization is similar to that in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999),
Cespedes et al. (2004) and Gertler et al. (2007).
10where DE
t+1 denotes foreign currency denominated debt. Equation (23) simply states
that capital ￿nancing is divided between net worth and foreign debt. It is clear that
the entrepreneurs are exposed to exchange rate risk -￿ uctuations in the nominal
exchange rate create balance sheet e⁄ects in the model.
Productivity is observed by the entrepreneur, but not by the lenders who have
imperfect knowledge of the distribution of !t+1(k). Following Curdia (2007, 2008)
we specify the lenders perception of !t+1(k) as given by !￿
t+1(k) = !t+1(k)%t where
%t is the misperception factor over a given interval [0,1]. We take the origin of the
￿nancial shock as a change in lenders￿perception regarding idiosyncratic productiv-
ity. We assume that when there is uncertainty about the underlying distribution,
lenders take the worst case scenario as the mean of the distribution of !t+1(k):(The
Appendix provides more details on the speci￿cation of the ambigiuity aversion faced
by lenders).9
Entrepreneurs observe !t+1(k) ex-post, but the lenders can only observe it at
a monitoring cost which is assumed to be a certain fraction (￿) of the return.10
As shown by Bernanke et al. (1999), the optimal contract between the lender and
the entrepreneur is a standard debt contract characterized by a default threshold,
!t+1(k); such that if !t+1(k) ￿ !t+1(k), the lender receives a ￿xed payment !t+1(k)
times the return on capital. If !t+1(k) < !t+1(k), then the borrower defaults, the
lender audits by paying the monitoring cost and keeps what it ￿nds. Therefore, we
























9In Curdia (2007, 2008), the perception factor is kept at its low state value during the sudden
stop periods, but there is a certain probability of exiting a sudden stop. Instead, we assume that
the perception factor gradually goes back to its steady state level (% = 1).
10This corresponds to the costly state veri￿cation problem indicated by Gale and Hellwig (1985).
11where RK
t denotes the ex-post realization of return to capital and z(!) is the bor-
rowers￿share of the total return. We use the de￿nition of the lender￿ s perception of
productivity shock !￿
t+1(k) in Equation (25) where g(!(k);%) represents the lenders￿
share of the total return, itself a function of both the idiosyncratic shock and the
perception factor.
Clearly, the opportunity cost of lending to the entrepreneur is the world interest
rate, (1+i￿
t): Thus the loan contract must satisfy the following for the lender to be





g(!t+1(k);%t)] = (1 + i￿
t)DE
t+1(k): (26)
The optimal contracting problem identi￿es the capital demand of entrepreneurs,
Kt+1(k) and a cut o⁄ value, !t+1(k) such that the entrepreneurs will maximize (24)
subject to (26). As shown in the Appendix, the ￿rst order conditions yield:
Et[RK
t+1] = Et[(1 + i￿
t)(1 + ￿t+1)]; (27)
where (1 + ￿t+1) is the external risk premium de￿ned by:












QtKt+1, of the entrepreneur.11 A greater use of external ￿nancing gen-
erates an incentive for entrepreneurs to take on more risky projects, which raises the
probability of default. This, in turn, will increase the external risk premium. There-
fore, any shock that has a negative impact on the entrepreneurs￿net worth increases
their leverage, resulting in an upward adjustment in the external risk premium.
We follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), in as-
suming that a proportion of entrepreneurs die in each period to be replaced by
new-comers. This assumption guarantees that self ￿nancing never occurs and bor-
rowing constraints on debt are always binding. Given that !(k) is independent of all
11See, Appendix A in Bernanke et al. (1999).
12other shocks and identical across time and across entrepreneurs, all entrepreneurs
are identical ex-ante. Then, each entrepreneur faces the same ￿nancial contract
speci￿ed by the cut o⁄ value and the external ￿nance premium. This allows us to
specify the rest of the model in aggregate terms.
At the beginning of period t, the entrepreneurs collect revenues and repay their
debt contracted at period t ￿ 1. Denoting #; as the fraction of entrepreneurs who
survive each period, the net worth can be expressed as follows:
PtNWt = #[RK
t Qt￿1Ktz(!t)] + WE
t : (29)
Equation (29) indicates that the entrepreneur￿ s net worth is made up of the return
on investment and the entrepreneurial wage income. Given that the borrower￿ s and
the lender￿ s share of total return should add up to z(!t)+g(!t;%t) = 1￿￿t (where
￿t is the cost of monitoring, a deadweight loss associated with ￿nancial frictions)
and by using the participation constraint (26), we can rewrite the net worth of the
entrepreneur as:
PtNWt = #[RK
t Qt￿1Kt(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ (1 + i￿
t￿1)StDE
t ] + WE
t : (30)
It is clear from (30) that unanticipated changes in the nominal exchange rate
increase the debt burden of the entrepreneur, and therefore decrease its net worth.
This, in turn, increases the leverage of the entrepreneur and raises the external risk
premium, implying a higher cost of ￿nancing. This is an additional mechanism that
magni￿es the role of the ￿nancial accelerator in the economy through transmitting
￿ uctuations in the nominal exchange rate to the balance sheets of entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs leaving the scene at time t consume their return on capital.
The consumption of the exiting entrepreneurs, CE
t , can then be written as:12
PtCE
t = (1 ￿ #)[RK
t Qt￿1Kt(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ (1 + i￿
t￿1)StDE
t ]: (31)
12It is assumed that the entrepreneurs consume an identical mix of domestic and foreign goods in
their consumption basket as is given by the composite consumption index in equation (2). Therefore



















13Because of investment adjustment costs and incomplete capital depreciation,
entrepreneurs￿return on capital, RK
t , is not identical to the rental rate of capital,
Rt. The entrepreneurs￿return on capital is the sum of the rental rate on capital
paid by the ￿rms that produce ￿nal consumption goods, the rental rate on used
capital from the ￿rms that produce un￿nished capital goods, and the value of the

























Finally, we adopt a standard formulation for the structure of monetary policy-
making. We assume that the interest rate rule is of the following form:
1 + it = (1 + i) (￿t)￿￿; (33)
where i steady-state level of nominal interest rate and ￿t is the CPI in￿ ation.
2.5 General Equilibrium and Balance of Payments Dynamics
Market clearing in the ￿nal good sector requires that total domestic output be equal
to domestic consumption, domestic investment and exports to the rest of the world.
Also, given that frictions such as adjustment and monitoring costs are expressed in
terms of the ￿nal composite good, part of the output is taken up with the price
adjustment costs for ￿nal consumption goods as well as those for imported and
exported goods and the monitoring costs. Thus the overall resource constraint faced
by the domestic economy can be written as:
Yt = YH;t + YX;t; (34)
where
YH;t = CH;t + CE























14with YX;t is the foreign demand for domestic goods and CH;t is the household con-
sumption demand, CE
H;t is the entrepreneur￿ s consumption demand, both for domes-
tic goods and IH;t is the domestic investment goods used by the un￿nished capital
producing ￿rms. In (35), ￿H;￿X and ￿M denote price adjustment costs for domes-
tic, exported and the imported good, respectively and ￿t is the cost of monitoring for
the lenders that is passed on to the domestic economy through the external ￿nance
premium.
The import demand of the domestic economy, YM;t; can be expressed as follows:
YM;t = CM;t + CE























where CM;t and CE
M;t are demand for imports by households and entrepreneurs, re-
spectively and IM;t is the domestic economy￿ s import demand for investment goods.




1￿￿ is the labor demand for non-entrepreneurial labour.
Substituting (34) and the pro￿ts of both the ￿nal good producing and the im-
porting ￿rms into the budget constraints of the households and the entrepreneurs
yields the following aggregate balance of payments condition after aggregation:
StPX;tYX;t ￿ StP￿
t YM;t = St(1 + i￿
t￿1)(DH
t ￿D;t￿1 + DE
t ) ￿ St(DH
t+1 + DE
t+1), (38)
where the ￿rst and the second terms on the left are exports and imports, respectively.
On the right is simply the change in the net foreign asset position, aggregated over
households and entrepreneurs.
The foreign variables Y ￿
t , P￿
t and i￿
t are endogenously determined in the ROW
block of the model. The market for domestic bonds must clear at all times, Bt = 0.
Since all households and ￿rms behave symmetrically, the rational expectations equi-
librium for the SOE is a set of stationary stochastic processes satisfying stationary
representations of the equations (3)-(5) (7)-(17),(21)-(23),(26)-(33); along with equi-
15librium conditions for the goods market (34) and the labor market (37); the balance





Although asymmetric in size, SOE and ROW share the same preferences, tech-
nology and market structure for consumption and capital goods. We also assume an
identical characterization for monetary policy in the SOE and the ROW. In e⁄ect,
therefore, the ROW block is a closed economy version of the model.
3 Solution and Model Parametrization
We ￿rst transform the model to reach a stationary representation where a steady
state exists. The model is then solved numerically up to a second order approxima-
tion using Sims (2005).13 Our choice of parameter values used in the calibration is
explained in the next section.
3.1 Consumption, Production and Monetary Policy
We set the discount factor, ￿ at 0:99, implying a riskless annual return of approxi-
mately 4 per cent in the steady state (time is measured in quarters). The inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is taken as ￿ = 1; which corresponds to
log utility. The inverse of the elasticity of labour supply ’ is set to 2 since it is as-
sumed that 1=2 of the time is spent on working. We set the degree of openness, 1￿￿,
to be 0:25 and the share of capital in production, ￿; is taken to be 0:35, following
Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007). The elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated
goods of the same origin, ￿; is taken to be 11, implying a ￿ exible price equilibrium
mark-up of 1:1; as set in Devereux et al. (2006). The quarterly depreciation rate ￿
is 0:025, a conventional value used in the literature. Similar to Gertler et al. (2007),
we set the share of entrepreneurs￿labour, ￿; at 0:01, implying that 1 per cent of the
total wage bill goes to the entrepreneurs. With regard to the parameters of export
demand, we follow Curdia (2007, 2008), and assume that exports constitute 10 per
cent of the total foreign demand and thus set ￿￿ at 0:1 with a price elasticity of
unity, ￿￿ = 1. In the baseline calibration, we use the original Taylor estimates and
set ￿￿ = 1:5. The nominal interest rate is then assumed not to directly react to
changes in other variables in the speci￿ed Taylor rule in the model.
13The non-stochastic steady state of the model is solved numerically in MATLAB, and then the
second order approximation of the model and the stochastic simulations are computed using Michel
Juillard￿ s software Dynare. Details of the computation of the non-stochastic steady state and the
stationary model equations are available upon request.
16Table 1: Parameter Values for Consumption, Production Sectors and Monetary
Policy
￿ = 0:99 Discount factor
￿ = 1 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
￿ = 1 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
’ = 2 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
(1 ￿ ￿) = 0:25 Degree of openness
￿ = 0:35 Share of capital in production
￿ = 11 Elasticity of substitution between domestic goods
￿ = 0:025 Quarterly rate of depreciation
￿ = 0:01 Share of entrepreneurial labor
￿￿ = 0:1 Share of exports in foreign demand
￿￿ = 1 Foreign demand price elasticity
￿I = 12 Investment adjustment cost
￿i;￿M;￿F = 120 Price adjustment costs for i = H;X
￿￿ = 1:5 Coe¢ cient of CPI in￿ ation in the policy rule
3.2 Entrepreneurs
The parameter values for the entrepreneurial sector in the SOE and ROW are set
to re￿ ect their de￿ning characteristics and are listed in Table 2. We set the leverage
ratio in the domestic economy, ￿, at 0:9: The monitoring cost parameter, ￿, is taken
as 0:2 for the SOE as in Devereux et al. (2006). We follow Elekdag and Tchakarov
(2007), in setting the steady state value of the quarterly external risk premium, ￿t, at
185 basis points. These parameter values imply a survival rate, #, of approximately
96:97 per cent in the SOE.
For the ROW, we closely follow Bernanke et al. (1999). The foreign leverage
ratio is set to 0:5. The risk spread of 2 per cent in the steady state is reported for
the US economy so we set a quarterly external risk premium, ￿￿
t, of 0:005. The cost
of monitoring, denoted by ￿￿; is taken to be 0:12. Given these parameter values, the
implied survival rate is 97:95 per cent in the ROW. Note that setting a higher lever-
age ratio for domestic entrepreneurs implies greater ￿nancial frictions in the SOE as
compared with the ROW. This is based upon the experiences of emerging market
countries where there is greater foreign borrowing than in mature economies. This
di⁄erence in ￿nancial vulnerability of the two economies has important implications
17Table 2: Parameter Values for Entrepreneurial Sector
Small Open Economy
￿t = 0:0185 External risk premium
￿ = 0:2 Monitoring cost
# = 0:9873 Survival rate
Rest of the World
￿￿
t = 0:005 External risk premium
￿￿ = 0:12 Monitoring cost
# = 0:9966 Survival rate
for our results.
4 Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks
In this section, we analyze the response of macroeconomic aggregates to two types
of ￿nancial shock: one is originated in the domestic economy and the other is global.
In both cases, the source of the ￿nancial shock is the change in lenders￿perception
of the entrepreneurs￿productivity. We assume that both %t and %￿
t, the perception
of lenders regarding the domestic and the foreign entrepreneurs￿productivity, follow
AR(1) processes with persistence ￿% and ￿%￿; respectively.
4.1 Financial Crisis in the Domestic Economy
We ￿rst investigate the case of a domestic ￿nancial crisis. In what follows, we explore
how an unanticipated (temporary) shock to the investors￿perception of the entre-
preneurs￿productivity is transmitted to the rest of the economy. Such a perception
shock leads to a reversal of capital ￿ ows out of the domestic country, which we refer
to as the sudden stop. The response of the domestic economy to the sudden stop is
presented in Figure 1.14 When the investors￿perception about the distribution of
the entrepreneurs￿productivity changes, lending to domestic entrepreneurs becomes
more risky, leading to a rise in the external risk premium on impact. As the cost of
borrowing rises, entrepreneurs reduce their use of external ￿nancing by undertaking
fewer projects. This decline in leverage causes a downward adjustment in the risk
14The impulse responses show the responses of the economy to a 2 per cent (negative) misper-
ception shock. The variables are presented as log-deviations from the steady state, multiplied by
100 to have an interpretation of percentage deviations.
18premium, mitigating the initial impact of a sudden stop to some extent. Lower
borrowing, however, decreases the future supply of capital and hence brings about
a decrease in investment in the economy. Therefore output falls and real exchange
rate depreciates. The decrease in the in￿ ow of capital also lowers the demand for
domestic currency, leading to its depreciation. Since the entrepreneurs￿borrowing
is denominated in foreign currency, this unanticipated change in the exchange rate
also creates balance sheet e⁄ects through raising the real debt burden. The outcome
is lower investment and output in the economy following the sudden stop in line
with the experience of several emerging market countries during the 1990s.
Although the rise in the nominal exchange rate puts an upward pressure on the
CPI based in￿ ation, the decrease in the domestic price level more than o⁄sets this
e⁄ect, bringing about a fall in the CPI. In spite of this lower price level, however,
aggregate demand falls due to lower investment and output, resulting in lower labor
demand and thereby lower real wages.
There is an additional channel through which the e⁄ect of the shock is transmit-
ted to the rest of the economy, working through the export demand. The increase
in the ROW￿ s demand for domestic goods, following the depreciation of the domes-
tic currency, raises net exports, although this e⁄ect is not strong enough to o⁄set
the decline in domestic demand in our simulations. In practice, the export channel
has been very e⁄ective for countries that are hit by ￿nancial crises and experience
a sizable loss of value of their currencies. For instance, most East Asian countries
bene￿tted from signi￿cant improvements in their exports following the 1997 Asian
crisis, which has been widely agreed to be an important factor in their swift re-
coveries (see, for example, Bleaney, 2005). It is worth noting that this favorable
impact of export demand on output recovery not only disappears but starts to work
in the opposite direction when we consider a ￿nancial crisis originating in the global
economy, as is presented in the following section.
4.2 Financial crisis in the ROW
We now turn to exploring the channels through which a ￿nancial shock originating in
the ROW is transmitted to the SOE. The perception shock is now taken to be faced
by the ROW entrepreneurs and we take this to represent the case of a global ￿nancial
crisis. We also assume that investors￿perception regarding the true distribution of
entrepreneurs￿productivity in the ROW and the SOE are inherently related. The
19main rationale for this assumption is twofold. First, investors optimally choose the
scale and the terms of credits they extend to borrowers in a forward looking manner.
For instance, when faced with credit tightening in the global economy, investors can
anticipate ex-ante that this will be transmitted to the SOE through real and ￿nancial
cross-country linkages, implying an unfavorable change in their perceptions of the
domestic entrepreneurs today. Second, some asset market linkages such as herding
behavior only or mainly exist during times of crisis and may be commonly referred
to as "pure contagion" (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000 and Moser,
2003).
Figure 2 presents the domestic economy￿ s response to a global ￿nancial shock
-de￿ned as an unfavorable change in investors perception regarding entrepreneurs
in the ROW. We set the foreign shock to be the same in magnitude (2 per cent) as
in the previous case so that the responses are comparable with Figure 1. Responses
presented in Figure 2 reveal that the impact of the global ￿nancial shock on the
domestic economy is larger than that of a domestic one. Although the change in the
perception of foreign investors about the state of the domestic economy is identical
under the two scenarios, falls in both capital and investment are greater with the
global ￿nancial shock and the fall in output is twice the size. Similarly, the decrease
in foreign borrowing is twice as large as that of the previous case, leading to a much
sharper depreciation of the domestic currency. Likewise, changes in in￿ ation, asset
prices and employment under the global ￿nancial shock are much more pronounced
than for the domestic sudden stop.
There are two mechanisms that amplify the e⁄ects of a global shock on the do-
mestic economy. The ￿rst works through the unfavorable impact of the contraction
in the ROW on net exports of the domestic economy. The reduction in net worth,
capital, investment and output in the ROW is shown in Figure 3. The output fall in
the rest of the world reduces the domestic economy￿ s net exports and deteriorates
the domestic GDP. The second mechanism through which the global ￿nancial shock
impacts upon the domestic economy is through the ￿nancial spill-overs. A deterio-
ration in investors￿perception in the domestic economy following that in the ROW
raises the external risk premium, setting in motion the process described above.
Having established that a global ￿nancial shock is transmitted to the domestic
economy through both the trade and ￿nancial channels, it follows that the extent
20of the domestic response to a global ￿nancial tightening will vary with the degree
of an economy￿ s trade and ￿nancial integration with the rest of the world. The
relationship between a country￿ s openness to trade and its vulnerability to sudden
stops has already been the focus of an extensive literature (see, for example Calvo et
al. 2004, 2006 and Martin and Rey, 2006). A common ￿nding in this literature has
been that openness makes countries less vulnerable to crises. In contrast, we ￿nd
that when the ￿nancial shock originates in the rest of the world - when the crisis is
a global one- the more open an economy, the greater the unfavorable consequences
of the ￿nancial crisis for the domestic economy. Indeed, among the countries that
have experienced largest falls in economic activity during the current ￿nancial crisis
have been Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey, all of which are highly open economies.15
Figures 4 and 5 depict the domestic responses to a foreign ￿nancial shock under
varying degrees of trade and ￿nancial integration between the domestic and foreign
economy, respectively. In our simulations the degree of trade integration is measured
by (1￿￿); the share of imports in domestic consumption. The pro￿le of the SOE in
Figure 4 clearly exhibits the important role played by the degree of trade openness
in the ampli￿cation of the global ￿nancial shock. As is seen from the responses
in Figure 4, the greater the trade integration between the two countries, the more
signi￿cant is the impact of the global ￿nancial crisis on the SOE.
A similar relationship between ￿nancial openness and the severity of the crisis
is revealed by Figure 5 (in which the degree of spill-overs between the SOE and the
ROW is measured by ￿). Clearly, the greater the ￿nancial integration between the
domestic and the foreign economy, the greater the spill-overs between the ￿nancial
sectors of the two countries.
5 Conclusions
This paper has developed an open economy DSGE model to investigate the trans-
mission of a global ￿nancial crisis to a small open economy. Our framework has two
important novel features. First, in contrast to most existing small open economy
models, we present a two-country framework where both trade and ￿nancial linkages
between the countries are fully speci￿ed. Secondly, we incorporate ￿nancial frictions
15The fall in output in the ￿rst quarter of 2009 as compared with a year earlier was 10.1, 10.2
and 13.8 per cent for Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey, respectively. Similarly, Germany and Japan,
that are among the most open of mature economies, contracted by 6.9 and 8.8 per cent, respectively
over the same period (The Economist, July 4th, 2009).
21in an explicit manner where the external ￿nance premium is fully derived from ￿rst
principles of the optimal contract problem between the borrowers and the lenders.
This framework allows us to account for some important aspects of the current
global ￿nancial crisis experience. We ￿nd that small open economies facing a sudden
stop of capital in￿ ows arising from ￿nancial distress in the global economy are likely
to face a more prolonged crisis than sudden stop episodes of domestic origin. This
is largely attributable to an important source of di¢ culty in responding to a global
￿nancial shock -the inability of countries to export their way out of a crisis due
to the slump in world consumer demand initiated by the global ￿nancial distress.
In contrast, when the ￿nancial shock is of domestic origin, the domestic economy
bene￿ts from the depreciation of its currency and the resulting current account
reversal, which at least partly compensates for the fall in economic activity. This
bene￿cial export channel disappears and indeed works in the opposite direction
when the rest of the world also faces an unfavorable ￿nancial disturbance. The
resulting contraction in output in the foreign economy is transmitted to the domestic
economy through a fall in export demand, further reducing aggregate demand for
home produced goods. This, in turn, is likely to increase the duration and the
severity of crises for both countries in question, as mutual reductions in export
demand set in motion a vicious circle, even in the absence of any protectionist
policies. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature, we ￿nd that the greater a
country￿ s trade integration with the rest of the world, the greater the response of its
macroeconomic aggregates to a sudden stop of capital ￿ ows.
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25Appendix
Optimal Contracting Problem
We assume that each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic shock !t 2 [0;1)
with E(!t) = 1 and c.d.f and p.d.f are given by F(!t) and f(!t). We de￿ne z(!) as
the expected gross share of the proceeds going to the borrower (ignoring the time















￿ 1 ￿ ￿(!),
where ￿(!) = [1 ￿ F(!)]! +
R !
0 !dF(!), following Bernanke et al. (1999).
Let RC
t be the contractual rate speci￿ed by the lender. By de￿nition, the default
threshold (!t+1(k)) is set at the level of returns that is just enough to honor the







Recall that the misperception of investors regarding the distribution of !t+1 is rep-
resented by %t such that !￿
t+1(k) = !t+1(k)%t. As in Curdia (2007, 2008), we write
the participation constraints of the investors (in foreign currency):
(1 + i￿
t)DE
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0 !dF(!) and note that G(!) = F(!)E(!j! <
!). Then we similarly express:












Noting that the monitoring cost (vt) is given by ￿G￿(!) and substituting (A2),































We assume that the aggregate risk in terms of exchange rate and return to capital
is borne by lenders such that the participation constraint holds with expectations as
in Cespedes et al. (2004), Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007) and Curdia (2007, 2008).
Therefore, it should be clear that return to capital (RK) and the cut o⁄ value (!)
are state contingent and the participation constraint holds ex post with equality at
each possible state.
We can now analyze the optimal contract which determines a state contingent
cut o⁄ value !t and Kt+1(k) solving the following maximization problem:
max Et[RK
t+1Qt+1Kt+1(k)z(!t+1(k))]



















where U is the state of the world, ￿(U) is the probability of the state U and ￿t+1 is














Given that entrepreneurs are identical ex ante, each entrepreneur faces the same
￿nancial contract. We can then write the external risk premium (1+￿t+1) as follows:








Using (A12), (A11) can be re-written as Et[RK
t+1] = Et[(1 + i￿
t)(1 + ￿t+1)]. These
two equations correspond to (28) and (27) in the text.












































































































































































































































































31Figure 4: Dynamic Responses to a Financial Crisis in ROW: Domestic Economy




































































































32Figure 5: Dynamic Responses to a Financial Crisis in ROW: Domestic Economy
(degree of ￿nancial integration-￿)
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